Abstract-In many Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), providing end to end secure communications between sensors and the sink is important for secure network management. While there have been many works devoted to hop by hop secure communications, the issue of end to end secure communications is largely ignored. In this paper, we design an end to end secure communication protocol in randomly deployed WSNs. Specifically, our protocol is based on a methodology called differentiated key pre-distribution. The core idea is to distribute different number of keys to different sensors to enhance the resilience of certain links. This feature is leveraged during routing, where nodes route through those links with higher resilience. Using rigorous theoretical analysis, we derive an expression for the quality of end to end secure communications, and use it to determine optimum protocol parameters. Extensive performance evaluation illustrates that our solutions can provide highly secure communications between sensor nodes and the sink in randomly deployed WSNs. We also provide detailed discussion on a potential attack (i.e. biased node capturing attack) to our solutions, and propose several countermeasures to this attack.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
IRELESS Sensor Networks (WSNs) are envisaged in military, emergency and surveillance applications today, where sensor nodes need to send sensed data to the sink. In many applications under hostile environment, sensor nodes cannot be deployed deterministically and thus are randomly deployed into the field. An important requirement in network management of many mission critical applications is to secure end to end sensor networks data from being eavesdropped by the attacker. While there have been many works devoted to hop by hop secure communications in WSNs, the issue of end to end secure communications is largely ignored. This is mainly due to the fact that there exist two intuitive approaches to provide a high degree of end to end secure communications in WSNs:
• The first one is distributing a unique pairwise key into each sensor and the sink prior to deployment, and letting each sensor use this pairwise key to encrypt the communications with the sink;
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• The second one is simply providing hop by hop secure communications between neighboring sensors in the network. It is in general believed that in this way end to end secure communications can naturally be achieved via hop by hop encryption/decryption.
The first approach has critical limitations in multi-hop WSNs since it precludes the possibility of intermediate sensors performing encryption/decryption along the path. This feature is necessary for interpreting and aggregating data at intermediate sensors to save energy (a critical requirement in WSNs), authenticating received data to defend against fake packets injection attack, denial of service attack etc. Hence in WSNs, we need to use hop by hop based encryption/decryption in providing end to end secure communications.
The second approach works well if all links in the network are highly resilient. However, it is very hard, if not impossible, to achieve high resilience for all the links in randomly deployed WSNs. This is due to inherent resource limitation of sensor, nature of random deployment and presence of attacks. In fact, with random key pre-distribution (RKP) [1] based schemes, a majority of links in the network have low resilience under reasonable memory constraint and even under mild attack strength, which restricts room for providing a high degree of end to end secure communications. In the following, we give an example to illustrate this fact.
In order to provide secure communications between neighboring nodes in randomly deployed WSNs, Random key predistribution (RKP) was proposed [1] . In its basic version, each sensor is pre-distributed with distinct keys randomly chosen from a large pool of keys. After deployment, neighboring nodes use these pre-distributed keys to establish a pairwise key between them. Communications between neighboring sensors in each hop are encrypted/decrypted using these pairwise keys. Many key management protocols have been proposed based on key pre-distribution [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , etc., each one improving upon one or more features of [1] .
The resilience of each hop (link) can be reflected by the number of shared pre-distributed keys in the link. It is known that under uniform key distribution, i.e. each sensor predistributed with equal number of keys, will achieve maximum average number of shared pre-distributed keys in each link. However, there is an inherent limitation in uniform key distribution as demonstrated in Fig. 1 . In Fig. 1 , we have 1000 nodes randomly deployed in a circular network with radius 500
, where = 40, = 10000 and communication range of each node is 100
. We can see that a majority of links have low resilience (i.e., small number of shared keys), while the percentage of links that are highly resilient is quite low. This clearly restricts the room for routing protocols to choose more resilient links during end to end communications. Installing more keys into each node is not always preferable since it enables the attacker to disclose more keys upon node captures, which could again compromise the link resilience.
Our Contributions: In this paper, we design an end to end secure communication protocol in randomly deployed WSNs. The contributions of our work are four-fold:
• We propose a methodology called differentiated key predistribution for end to end secure communications in randomly deployed WSNs. Our protocol is based on this methodology. The core idea of the methodology is to predistribute different number of keys to different nodes. By distributing more keys to some nodes, the links between those nodes tend to have much higher resilience than the link resilience under uniform key pre-distribution. These high resilient links are preferred during routing to enhance the end to end secure communications. For fairness in analysis, we keep the average number of keys per node in our scheme the same as that in uniform key pre-distribution. Assuming that the probability of node capture is the same for all nodes, the attack impact (i.e., expected number of unique keys disclosed under node capturing attack) remains the same in both uniform and our heterogeneous key distribution scheme, making performance comparisons fair. Furthermore, we also discuss impact of biased node capturing attacks in this paper.
• Based on the above methodology, we design a new end to end secure communication protocol in WSNs. In our protocol, links with high resilience are preferred compared to links with low resilience during routing to sink node. Besides, we apply alternative path routing among high resilience links to achieve good balance between end to end secure communications and lifetime.
• We conduct a rigorous theoretical study on the proposed protocol, and determine the optimal way to differentially pre-distribute keys into nodes. Our major performance metric is the probability that the sink can receive a message from a sensor without it being disclosed to the attacker (denoted as 2 ). We first derive the expressions for 2 . Based on the expressions, we show how to determine the optimal way to differentially pre-distribute keys into nodes to maximize the value of 2 . All our results are further validated using extensive simulations, which confirm that end to end secure communications can be significantly improved by our solutions.
• We conduct an investigation on the certain advanced attacks (called biased node capturing attacks) to our proposed scheme. We find that our scheme does not incur serious vulnerability to such advanced attacks. Nevertheless, to further minimize the vulnerability, we propose a variety of countermeasures against such attacks. Paper Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss related works. We discuss our differentiated key pre-distribution methodology, and present our end to end secure communication protocol in Sections III and IV respectively. We study advanced attacks in Sections V, and finally conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. based Schemes
In this section, we provide a brief background on random key pre-distribution ( ) schemes, attack models and performance metrics in randomly deployed WSNs.
Basic Scheme: A well accepted scheme for secure communications in randomly deployed WSNs is random key pre-distribution (RKP) [1] , where there are two stages. At the key pre-distribution stage, each node is pre-distributed with distinct keys randomly chosen from a large pool of keys, and then nodes are randomly deployed. At the pairwise key establishment stage, each node first obtains its neighborhood information. If two neighbors share one or more pre-distributed keys, they establish a pairwise key in between directly. To do so, one node can generate a random pairwise key and send it to its neighbor encrypted with their shared keys. For two neighbors that do not share pre-distributed key, they will use neighboring nodes, called proxies, to construct key paths for pairwise key establishment using above process.
Variants of Scheme: Many variants have been proposed based on the above idea of key pre-distribution in WSNs, including for homogeneous sensor networks, heterogeneous sensor networks and also (more recently) mobile sensor networks. While some works focus primarily on extensions to the basic scheme, other works focus on more involved extensions. In this section, we provide a detailed description of well known and recent works in this area.
We first discuss important related work on key management in homogeneous sensor networks, where the number of keys distributed per node is the same, and the network topology is flat. In order to overcome the resilience of the basic key management protocol in [1] , in [2] and [7] , multiple key paths are used to enhance resilience of the link between two nodes. However, exploiting high resilience key paths for routing is not discussed. In [4] and [5] , keys are pre-distributed according to well known optimization designs, which helps increase key sharing between nodes. In [3] and [6] , each sensor is pre-distributed with key structures (vectors or polynomials) from a key structure pool, where each key structure has degree . In such schemes, no key structure is disclosed until at least +1 nodes pre-distributed with this key structure are captured. When = 0, this scheme degrades to the basic RKP scheme. In [8] , a similar technique is proposed called Triangle based key management, in which deployment information about expected locations of nodes and polynomial based key predistribution are used. The idea is to divide the network into triangular cells, each of which is associated with a unique random bivariate polynomial. Each sensor node is provided with a set of polynomials belonging to cells nearest to the nodes. Based on this structure, direct key and multi-hop (indirect) key establishment protocols are developed, along with mechanisms for key revocation and additions.
There are works on key management in heterogeneous sensor networks. The work in [9] is most similar to ours. In [9] , cluster heads are distributed with more keys than normal sensors. However, in analysis of [9] , cluster heads are assumed to be equipped with a fast encryption/deletion algorithm to protect their supplementary keys from compromise. The authors also admit that successful capturing of a cluster head node can severely compromise the resilience of their scheme. The resilience degradation is our protocol is much more graceful under attacks. Secondly, the protocol proposed in [9] is only for pair-wise key establishment. We propose two resilience aware routing protocols: data centric and location centric protocols in this paper that further exploit the idea of differentiated keys among sensors. Also, the work in [9] only mentions biased node capture attacks, while we discuss biased node capture attacks and design countermeasures against them in this paper. In [10] , a key management scheme is proposed, where sensor nodes are organized into multiple hierarchies using a tree structure. The keys are divided in different categories such as cluster key (shared among all members of the cluster), intermediate key (shared between a smaller subset of cluster members) and private key of each sensor (used to communicate with cluster head). In our scheme, we do not use different cluster head keys, but rather use same key pools that reduces complexity during key pre-distribution and subsequent pair-wise set-up. Also, the scheme in [10] suffers from poor resilience under node compromises. In [11] , a protocol for cluster-head selection is proposed, and ideas are proposed for key additions and revocations under network dynamics via one-way hash functions. Trust protocols are designed during initial cluster setup. Periodic use of hash functions for key revocation and refreshment however can be energy consuming. In [12] , a scheme is proposed for heterogeneous sensor networks wherein sensors use initial keys to securely establish trust with their peers. This happens under a safe period when there are no attacks. Subsequently, energy efficient key management protocols are designed as a function of desired degree of secure communications.
In [13] , more complicated security designs are envisioned for secure sensor networks like non-group confidentiality, forward confidentiality and backward confidentiality. The paper assumes a safe period when secrets are established. Techniques are proposed for key revocation under compromises, although it is not quite clear as to how compromises can be detected. A similar idea is also proposed in [14] , for similar requirements except that bi-variate polynomials are used instead of symmetric keys. In [15] , a robust and secure key management scheme for hierarchical sensor networks using self-healing mechanisms is proposed. The focus is on group key distribution, wherein the idea is a combination of reverse and forward hash chains. The paper also deals with attacks against individual nodes and group heads. The protocol ensures security of un-compromised nodes until a minimum number of nodes are compromised in the same group. In [16] also, protocols are proposed for group communications among sensors and cluster-heads. The approach uses symmetric keys throughout, and also proposes a protocol for cluster-head selection to maximize chances of key sharing with sensors in the group. Protocols are also designed for authentication of packets and nodes, and confidentiality for important packets in the network. Other works like [17] - [19] propose ideas for key management in hierarchical sensor networks emphasizing on aspects like key updation and revocation, energy efficiency, and mitigating attacks like guessing attacks, replay attacks, man-in-the-middle and denial of service attacks. Unfortunately, the downsides of such works are in the complexity in key pre-distribution and subsequent pairwise key set-up, which increases overhead. Furthermore, it is not quite clear as to how such schemes perform under biased node capture attacks. Nevertheless, we believe that the works referenced above are orthogonal to our contributions in this paper which focuses primarily on data confidentiality of end-to-end secure communications. Extending our techniques for incorporating additional security requirements within the network would an interesting area of future work.
In the recent past, there have been a host of orthogonal dimensions where random key pre-distribution has been adapted in sensor networks. While works in [20] - [27] use deployment knowledge (i.e., partial knowledge of sensor locations in the network) to enhance pair-wise key set-up among nodes, exploiting traffic models in sensor networks for secure communications is studied in [28] based on the premise that traffic patterns are governed by network topologies which is exploited during key set-up and data delivery. There have also been works in sensor network key management where principles of Genetic Algorithms are used for key management [29] , [30] . In [30] , genetic algorithms are used to optimize memory usage, power control and computational security in sensor networks. In [29] , genetic algorithms are used to optimize network performance from the perspective of operation cost, security and survivability.
Mobile sensor networks have recently been studied in [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] , and there have been some recent efforts on key management on them. In [35] , a pair-wise key management in sensor networks is proposed where sensors can move from one network to another. If a sensor is allowed to roam from one network to another, it has to communicate with different base stations, and hence it should have shared keys with the new base stations. Attackers might fake as a new incoming sensor to a network to know the key of the network base station. So the base station needs authentication of incoming nodes. The paper proposes a secure authorization scheme and pair-wise key establishment between the roaming sensor and the new base stations that it needs to communicate with. In [36] , security, integrity and authentication services in wireless sensor and actor networks are studied. Such networks consist of static sensors and resource rich actor nodes (that are also mobile), which are responsible for more sophisticated responses to sensed events without human intervention.
The authors propose to divide the wireless sensor and actor network into upper and lower layers, with the lower layer using symmetric key management, and the upper layer using asymmetric key cryptography. Similarly in [37] , a scheme is proposed for group based key management that can be used for both static and mobile sensor networks. The objective is to provide secure communication, data confidentiality using secure data aggregation and resilience. The network is divided into clusters and homomorphic encryption is used. The scheme supports inter and intra cluster roaming of sensors.
There have also been recent works on key pre-distribution for real life sensor network missions. In [38] , a sensor network key management is proposed for process control systems to secure both forward (future key secrecy to captured nodes) and backward (past key secrecy to new incoming nodes) secrecy. The paper proposes a scheme that updates shared symmetric keys between a node or group of nodes and network manager of PCA/SCADA. The work specially focuses on enhancing security in the remote fields which are the weakest components in SCADA. The attack model is node capture attack which might lead to software corruption, impersonation attack, future key disclosure etc. They use a hash key chain for group key update and pair-wise key update. In [39] , a mathematical analysis of random key pre-distribution in sensor networks is attempted, from the perspective of network connectivity. The authors conduct a mathematical analysis to show that the number of communication links needed for a sensor to assure complete network connectivity is very large in real life applications. They do an analysis then showing that under node failures, faults and interference, the actual number of neighbors can be fewer in real-time sensor network operations.
Orthogonally, there are also works that address end-to-end secure communications in sensor networks without random key pre-distribution techniques. One particularly interesting work is [40] , that primarily focuses on end-to-end data confidentiality by performing intermediate data aggregation via homomorphic encryption techniques. In their technique, each sensor can derive its own private key based on a master secret, which is only known to the sink. Then, all data from sensors is encrypted with keys of other sensors via a homomorphic encryption technique that allows aggregation on encrypted data hop by hop, which can then be recovered by the sink. The downside of such attempts is that while in-network aggregation is done, in-network processing (encryption/ decryption) of data cannot be directly accomplished. As we know, there are several advantages with in-network processing of data like in-network (and local) aggregation, localized verification of data trust and integrity, local filtering of malicious data etc. Furthermore, in applications where the sink needs to know individual data (and not just aggregates), the work in [40] has limited applicability. Our work is different in the sense that we are focusing on end-to-end secure communications via a combination of key management and routing techniques in the network, while still retaining the advantages of in-network aggregation.
Attack Models: In the standard attack model used in secure communications in WSNs [2] , [1] , [7] , etc., the attacker launches two types of attacks. In node capturing attack, the attacker physically captures a certain percent of sensor nodes, and is able to disclose the pre-distributed and pairwise keys stored in those captured nodes. The sink node is assumed to be well protected and cannot be captured. In link monitoring attack, the attacker monitors all wireless links after deployment. Clearly, all communications of captured nodes are deciphered by the attacker. Furthermore, by combining the disclosed predistributed keys and messages recorded, the attacker can infer some pairwise keys between other uncaptured nodes. The attack model used in our paper is one where the attacker launches both node capturing and link monitoring attacks.
While works like [41] , [42] assume a safe period (no node capture) after deployment, this may not be realistic in practice, and this attack model is not widely adopted. Note that when multiple key paths are used to establish a pairwise key on a link, that pairwise key (link) is not compromised until all the key paths are compromised. The above attack model has a salient feature in that it is hard to detect the attacker. This is because the attacker only passively monitors traffic after nodes capture, and does not send out traffic actively. In [43] , a variety of active attack models are proposed against routing protocols, which require the attacker to actively send out fake/modified messages. Dealing with those attacks is orthogonal to our work, and thus is out of our scope.
Performance Metrics: Note that while our goal is endto-end secure communications in WSNs, we are (as pointed before) still interested in local in-network data processing among sensors during network operation. Consequently (as in standard RKP schemes), we use two standard metrics: connectivity and resilience to evaluate our key management scheme. Connectivity is the probability that two physical neighbors can establish a pairwise key between them. Note that while the above definition refers to local connectivity and is the standard metric, one could also define global (end-to-end) connectivity as the probability that the entire network is securely connected, or as the number of nodes in the largest connected component of the secure network. Global connectivity can be inferred by local connectivity [44] , we focus only on local connectivity (henceforth called connectivity) in this paper. Resilience is the probability that a pairwise key (link) between two nodes is not compromised under attack.
B. Routing Protocols in WSNs
Routing in wireless sensor networks has some differences from that in traditional wired and wireless ad hoc networks due to resource constraints, faults/failures etc. There are two main paradigms of routing protocols in WSNs: location-centric routing and data-centric routing. Other paradigms include hierarchical routing and security aware routing.
Location-centric routing: Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) [45] is a well known location centric routing protocol. In GPSR, beacon messages are broadcast by each node to inform its neighbors of its position. GPSR assumes that sensors can determine through separate means the location of the sink. Each node makes forwarding decisions based on the relative position of the sink and its neighbors. In general, the neighbor that is closest to the sink is chosen.
Data-centric routing: Directed diffusion [46] is the most well known data centric routing protocol, in which the sink sends queries to all nodes and waits for data from the nodes satisfying specific requirement (e.g., located in selected regions, sensing data meet certain criteria, etc). In order to create a query, an interest is defined using a list of attributevalue pairs such as name of objects, geographical area, etc. The interest is broadcast through the network, and used by each node to compare with the data received. The interest entry also contains several gradient fields. A gradient is a reply link to a neighbor from which the interest was received. By utilizing interests and gradients, paths are established between sensors and the sink. Several paths may be established, and one of them is selected by reinforcement.
Other Paradigms: Two other paradigms for routing in WSNs are hierarchical [47] and security aware routing [48] , [49] . In the former, certain nodes are either pre-assigned or chosen at run time to be cluster heads. Routing takes place on two planes: sensor to sensor towards cluster head and cluster head to cluster head towards the sink. In this paper, we focus on flat networks. The issue of hierarchy is discussed in Section IV-D. In security aware routing [48] , [49] , nodes route packets in the presence of attacks like fake packets injection, selective forwarding, etc. Such works, while definitely important are orthogonal to our work here, which focuses on securing communications from node capture and eavesdropper.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we will introduce our differentiated key predistribution methodology. In order to provide a high quality of end to end secure communications, it is clear that we should enhance the resilience of individual links in the network. An intuitive way to do so is to increase the number of keys predistributed into each node ( ). When the number of shared keys in each link increases, resilience seems to increase since all shared keys have to be disclosed to compromise the link.
However, such a solution is counter-productive. When increases, more keys are disclosed per node capture. The compromise of only a small percent of nodes can disclose many more keys to the attacker, which compromises the resilience of links. We need an approach by which link resilience can be enhanced without the downside of disclosing more keys to the attacker. On the other side, the number of predistributed keys ( ) is also subject to the memory constraint of sensor nodes.
In this paper, we propose a methodology called differentiated key pre-distribution to enhance the quality of end to end secure communications in randomly deployed WSNs. Our methodology is based on the observation that links in the network are not equally important with respect to secure communications. Only the links used for data transmission have impacts on security. The core idea of our methodology is to pre-distribute different number of keys to different nodes. We keep the average number of keys per node the same as that in uniform key pre-distribution, so that the attacker impact (e.g., average number of keys disclosed per node capture) remains the same. By distributing more keys to some nodes, the links between those nodes tend to have much higher resilience than the link resilience under uniform key predistribution. These high resilient links are preferred during routing to enhance the end to end secure communications.
We illustrate our methodology using the example in Fig. 1 , where 1000 sensors are deployed randomly in a WSN under the same scenario. We divide the 1000 nodes into two classes, with 200 nodes in the first class and 800 nodes in the second. We distribute 1 = 80 keys in each first class node and distribute 2 = 30 keys in each second class node. As such, the average number of keys per node (40) is the same as in Fig.  1 , where is the same for all nodes. In Table 1 , we show the impacts of our methodology. We can see that when we apply our differentiated key pre-distribution for the above setting, the number of high resilient links (those with large number of shared keys) dramatically increases, with the cost that the number of low resilience links also increases. This is because compared with the link resilience in traditional schemes with uniform key pre-distribution, the links between two first class nodes in our scheme tend to have higher resilience, while those between two second class nodes tend to have relatively lower resilience. When those high resilient links are preferred during routing path selection, the end to end security performance can be enhanced significantly.
Use of this methodology to provide end to end secure communications between sensor nodes and the sink in randomly deployed WSNs, raises the following important questions:
• How to determine the parameters in key pre-distribution?
We need to determine the number of node classes, the number of nodes in each class, and the number of keys distributed into nodes in each class. Determining the optimal values of these parameters needs a rigorous derivation of end to end secure communication performance.
• How to pre-distribute different number of keys into different classes of nodes? An intuitive way is always choosing keys randomly from the key pool regardless of node class. Is there any better way to achieve higher resilience? • How to do routing given links having different resilience?
In this situation, the length of routing path and energy balancing are not the only factors to consider during routing path selection. Link resilience also plays a role. Care should be taken to make a good balance among these factors.
• Will there be any new attack to our proposed scheme?
To achieve better security performance, nodes with more pre-distributed keys are likely to be selected to forward more traffic. The attacker may prefer choosing those nodes to capture. How can we defend against such attack?
IV. END-TO-END SECURE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we will address the first three questions above. The last question will be addressed in Section V. In particular, we will present our end to end secure communication protocol based on the methodology above. Our protocol consists of two components: differentiated key management and resilience aware routing. Table 2 lists the parameters in protocol description and their notations. Theoretical analysis is conducted to determine optimal protocol parameters. 
A. Differentiated Key Management
Our differentiated key management consists of two stages: key pre-distribution and pairwise key establishment. The main difference between our key management protocol and traditional based key management protocols lies in the stage of key pre-distribution.
Key Pre-distribution: We study a network with sensor nodes and one sink node. The sensor nodes are divided into classes, each of which has (1 ≤ ≤ ) nodes. We call the sensors in the ℎ class as class nodes. We then pre-distribute (1 ≤ ≤ and 1 ≥ 2 ≥ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≥ ) unique keys chosen from a large key pool with size into each class node, detail of which will be discussed in the following. Note that, the sink node is pre-distributed with all keys in the key pool. After this, the sink is deployed strategically at certain position, while the sensor nodes are deployed randomly in the network. The sensor nodes will execute the following protocols for pairwise key establishment and routing.
We detail our key pre-distribution in the following. For each class 1 node, its 1 unique keys are chosen randomly from the key pool. However we use a semi-random way to distribute keys into all other nodes to increase the chance of key sharing between these nodes and class 1 nodes. For a node in class ( > 1), ⌊ / 1 ⌋ keys are first chosen randomly from the distributed keys in each of 1 − ( − ⌊ / 1 ⌋ ⋅ 1 ) class 1 nodes, which are chosen randomly from all 1 class 1 nodes. For the remaining − ⌊ / 1 ⌋ ⋅ 1 class 1 nodes, ⌈ / 1 ⌉ keys are chosen randomly from the distributed keys of each node. We define ⌊ ⌋ as the largest integer no more than , and define ⌈ ⌉ as the smallest integer no less than . If some of the chosen keys are the same, the redundant keys will be re-chosen until all keys are distinct. We illustrate with a simple example. Let = 100, = 2,
The following is the key pre-distribution procedure. For each of the 20 nodes in class 1, we choose 80 distinct keys randomly from the key pool. For each of the 80 nodes in class 2, we choose 30 distinct keys as follows. We first randomly classify class 1 nodes into two types. Type has 10 (i.e., 1 −( 2 −⌊ 2 / 1 ⌋⋅ 1 )) nodes, and Type has 10 (i.e., 2 −⌊ 2 / 1 ⌋⋅ 1 ) nodes. Now, ⌊ 2 / 1 ⌋ = 1 key is chosen randomly from the pre-distributed keys in each of the 10 Type class 1 nodes above, and is distributed into the class 2 node under discussion. Then, ⌈ 2 / 1 ⌉ = 2 keys are chosen randomly from the pre-distributed keys in each of the 10 Type class 1 nodes above, and are distributed into the class 2 node under discussion. At this point, the class 2 node has 30 keys distributed. If these 30 keys are unique, key distribution is over. Otherwise, we redo the preceding 2 steps for the duplicate keys until all 30 keys are unique. Note that since 1 > 2 , uniqueness can always be guaranteed.
By distributing keys in this way, we guarantee unique keys are distributed, and the number of keys chosen from each class 1 node are balanced and differs by at most 1. The reason we pre-distribute keys for class nodes in the above semirandom way instead of purely randomly is two folded. First, we can enhance the probability that a class node shares key with a class 1 node. Second, we do not decrease the probability that a class node shares key with a non-class 1 node. Both facts are confirmed by our simulation, and can help increase link resilience. Besides, pre-distributing keys for non-class 1 nodes in the above way will not decrease the effective key space much, which is defined as the number of keys in the key pool that are distributed in at least one sensor node. This is because when the values of 1 , 1 and are carefully chosen, the number of unique pre-distributed keys among the 1 class 1 nodes is already close to .
Pairwise Key Establishment:
Once nodes are predistributed with keys and deployed, they start to discover their neighbors within their communication range via local communication, and obtain the key IDs of their neighbors' pre-distributed keys. With the above information, each node constructs all the one-hop and two-hop key paths to all its neighbors. If node shares pre-distributed keys with a neighbor , there is one direct key path with one hop between them. However, node will also construct all the two-hop key paths with each of its neighbors, regardless of whether a one-hop key path has been constructed or not, to enhance the link resilience (the attacker has to compromise all key paths for a link between two nodes in order to compromise this link). Suppose node wants to construct all two-hop key paths with node now. To do so, node sends a request to its neighbors, containing the node IDs of and . After a neighboring node receives the request, it checks if it shares pre-distributed keys with node and shares pre-distributed keys with node . If both conditions are satisfied, node sends a reply back to node . In this way, a two-hop key path − − is constructed. If possible, other two-hop key paths are also constructed as above. After node constructs all twohop key paths to node , node will generate multiple random key shares, and transmit each key share on each key path. Key shares are encrypted/decrypted hop by hop by a combination (e.g., XOR) of all shared keys on that hop. Ultimately, the pairwise key between nodes and is a combination of all the key shares (e.g, XOR) transmitted. Nodes also estimate and store the number of protection keys for each link as follows. Assume there are two-hop key paths between and , each with the help of proxy (1 ≤ ≤ ), and denote ( , ) as the number of shared keys between and . The number of 
We calculate ( , ) like this because the resilience of a twohop key path is mainly decided by the weaker link (the one with fewer shared keys). The larger the number of protection keys for a link, the more resilient is the link in general.
B. Resilience Aware Routing
In this section, we will describe how to incorporate our differentiated key pre-distribution with popular WSN routing protocols for end to end secure communications. We particularly focus on one popular location centric routing protocol and one popular data centric routing protocol. Incorporation with other routing paradigms is similar. The basic idea is to tune the routing protocols such that they consider link resilience as a metric during routing. In order to prevent overuse of a few nodes, we will let nodes choose several next hop nodes, and use one at each time to prolong network lifetime.
Extensions to location centric routing protocol: The location centric routing protocol we extend is GPSR [45] . In GPSR, each node chooses a neighbor as the next hop that is closest to the sink. In order to achieve high end to end secure communications without compromising network lifetime, we extend GPSR protocol as follows. Each node assigns a weight to all its secure neighbors (neighbors with which a pairwise key is established) that are closer to the sink than itself. We denote ( ) as the set of node 's secure neighbors that are closer to the sink than itself, and recall ( , ) is the number of protection keys for the link between nodes and , we assign weight to each node in set ( ) as,
Here is the probability that chooses as the forwarder. When = 0, all nodes in ( ) are given equal priority regardless of link resilience. When is positive, more resilient links are given higher priority. When approaches infinity, only the most resilient links are chosen for routing. An intermediate value of
can be used to achieve a good balance between security and lifetime, which can be decided by security policy and other factors. For example, a large value of can be chosen when high resilience is preferred and energy consumption imbalance is not a serious issue, while a small value of can be chosen when energy is limited and energy consumption balance is critical. We will study the sensitivity of security and lifetime to in Section IV-E.
Extensions to data centric routing protocol: In traditional minimum hop routing protocol [50] , a variant of Directed Diffusion routing protocol, a node will choose a neighbor on the minimum hop path to the sink. We can extend this protocol in a similar way as above. During the next hop determination process, packets are forwarded only on the minimum hop secure paths. A secure path consists of links that have pairwise keys established. We denote the set of neighbors on the minimum hop secure path of node by ( ). Note that in a relatively dense network, there could be several minimum hop secure paths between node and the sink. Node then assigns a weight to each of its secure neighbors in the set ( ). The expression of is given in (2).
C. Key Pre-distribution Parameters Determination
In this section, we discuss how to determine the design parameters in our proposed protocol above, namely number of node classes ( ), number of nodes in each class ( ) and number of keys in class nodes ( ). Our parameter determination is primarily based on the derivation of the end to end security metric 2 , which is detailed below.
1) Analysis Architecture:
Recall that 2 is the probability that the sink can receive a message from a sensor without it being disclosed to the attacker. We focus on the extended GPSR described above. To simplify the exposition, we here assign an overwhelming weight ( approaches infinity) to the most secure neighbor such that all traffic will be forwarded by it. When there are more than one such nodes, the one closest to the sink is chosen. We assume the number of captured nodes ( ) is known, which can be obtained from worst case estimation or historical experience.
Let 2 (ℓ) denote resilience for a path from a node to the sink with geographic distance ℓ. 2 can be obtained as,
Here, we assume the network is of a disk shape centered at the sink with radius . 2 for the networks with other shapes can be obtained accordingly.
For a specific ℓ, 2 (ℓ) can be expressed as,
where (ℎ|ℓ) is the conditional probability that a node at distance ℓ can reach the sink with ℎ hops, and ℎ (ℎ) is the end to end resilience for a path with ℎ hops.
In (4), ℎ (ℎ) can be calculated following its definition as probability that all nodes/links are uncaptured/uncompromised in the path with ℎ hops. It is multiplication of the probability that all ℎ nodes on the path are uncaptured, the probability that the first ℎ − 1 hops between two nodes are uncompromised, and the probability that the last hop between a node and the sink is uncompromised. Then we have,
In the above, (1) is the probability that a link between two uncaptured nodes is uncompromised, while (2) is the probability that a link between an uncaptured node and the sink is uncompromised.
In (5), the value of (
clearly remains the same under our differentiated key pre-distribution. The value of ( (1) ) ℎ−1 is increased since the resilience of high resilient links, which are preferred for routing, is increased under differentiated key pre-distribution. Similarly, the value of (2) is increased since the last hop node is more likely to be a node with large number of keys. Therefore, under differentiated key pre-distribution, the value of ℎ (ℎ) increases, which leads to the increase of 2 (ℓ) in (4). In (4), the value of (ℎ|ℓ) tends to decrease for small ℎ, and tends to increase for large ℎ in our protocol. This is because in extending GPSR or minhop protocol, we prefer high resilient links, which may not reside on the path with minimum hops. This will lead to the decrease of 2 (ℓ) in (4). However, such impact by (ℎ|ℓ) is dominated by that of ℎ (ℎ) in general, as confirmed by extensive simulations in Section IV-E. Overall, the values of 2 (ℓ) and 2 increase under differentiated key predistribution, which shows the benefit of our methodology. The derivations of (1) , (2) are given below. Due to space limitation, the derivations of (ℎ|ℓ) are skipped. In fact, our derivation of (ℎ|ℓ) is similar to the work in [51] and [52] .
2) Derivation of : Before we give the derivation for (1) and (2) , we need to derive , which is the probability that a node on the path between a sensor and the sink belongs to class . The probability of a class node appearing on the key path is different from the percentage of class nodes in the network. This is because during our routing path selection, we prefer the nodes on the highly resilient links, and those nodes are more likely to be nodes with more keys pre-distributed. We will show the derivation of in the following.
We first give some definitions. We define as percentage of class nodes in the network, given by = / . We define ℎ ( , , ℓ) as the probability that a class node shares ℓ keys with a class node, which can be given as,
If we define ( , ℓ) as the probability that a class node is preferred to a class ℓ node during routing path selection, the expression of ( , ℓ) can be given by,
) .
Finally, the expression of is given by,
In (8), is the average number of physical neighbors of a node, which is given by =
2
. Besides, (ℓ) equals 1 when ℓ = , and equals 0 otherwise.
3) Derivation of (1) and (2) : Given the expressions of derived above, we will derive the expressions for (1) and (2) in this section.
If we denote (1) ( , ) as resilience of the pairwise key between a class node and a class node, and (2) ( ) as the resilience of the pairwise key between a class node and the sink, the expressions of (1) and (2) can be given by,
We now derive the expressions for (1) ( , ) and (2) ( ).
We denote ( ) as the probability that at least one of unique pre-distributed keys is not disclosed to the attacker, denote ( , ) as the average number of shared pre-distributed keys between a class node and a class node, denote ( ) as the average number of shared pre-distributed keys between a class node and one of its physical neighbors, and denote ℎ ( , ) as the number of two-hop key paths between a class node and a class node. Thus, the expressions for (1) ( , ) and (2) ( ) can be given by,
In (11), ( ( , )) is probability that the direct onehop key path between a class node and a class node is uncompromised, / is probability that the proxy node on one of the two-hop key paths is captured, ( ( )) is the probability that the link on a two-hop key path between a class node and the proxy is uncompromised, and ( ( )) is defined similarly. A two-hop key path is uncompromised if the proxy is uncaptured and both links are uncompromised. The pairwise key between a class node and a class node is uncompromised if at least one key path (either one-hop or twohop key path) is uncompromised. In (12), number of shared pre-distributed keys between a class node and the sink is since the sink is assumed to have all pre-distributed keys and will not be captured. We now derive the expressions for ( ), ( , ), ( ) and ℎ ( , ). Given the number of captured nodes , the average number of disclosed pre-distributed keys, denoted by , is given by,
where is the average number of keys pre-distributed in a node. The expression of is given by,
Given the expression of above, we are able to give the expression of ( ) as,
Recall the expression of ℎ ( , , ℓ) in (6) above, the expressions of ( , ) and ( ) can be given by,
Finally, the expression of ℎ ( , ) can be given by,
where 0.5865 is the average number of common neighbors of two neighboring nodes [2] . Therefore, we have derived the expressions for (1) and (2) above.
Based on our derivation of 2 , we find that end to end security depends on several key pre-distribution parameters, that are, number of node classes ( ), number of nodes in each class ( ) and number of keys in class nodes ( ). The expression of 2 is clearly a nonlinear function of all the above parameters. Given the network parameters ( , , , ) and the memory constraint of sensors (maximum value of ), we can apply standard optimization tools on the above equations to obtain the optimal values for the design parameters.
The above analysis also has other usages. Consider a node
where 2 ( ) is decided by (4) . This bound follows directly by using Markov Inequality. The above inequality illustrates tradeoff between network size and end to end security performance. When network size ( ) increases, 2 ( ) decreases. Thus the upperbound in the right-hand side will decrease. For a required end to end resilience for any node in the network, there exists an upperbound for the network size, beyond which resilience cannot increase. Therefore, in a large scale network, we can deploy nodes in groups, each of which has a sink. We hence effectively decrease network size in each group, and can achieve the required end to end security performance.
D. Remarks
In the following, we will discuss the issues of empty set ( ) (discussed in Section IV-B), possibility of longer hops, extending our solutions to hierarchical networks, and the possibility of applying public key cryptography.
In extending GPSR, a node may find that its set ( ) is empty. In such case, node can follow the right hand rule in [45] to choose a secure neighbor that is further away from the sink than itself. If node does not to have any secure neighbor, it may increase its communication range to find some secure neighbors. Applying such rules will eliminate loops and guarantee finding a secure path if it exists. Increasing communication range for more secure neighbors works for the extended minimum hop protocol as well.
We point out that the number of path hops in our schemes could be larger than that in traditional GPSR or minimum hop routing schemes. This is because in our schemes, nodes choose neighbors considering both path length and link resilience, and thus could choose neighbors on a path with more hops. Besides, as mentioned above, a node may choose a secure neighbor that is further away from the sink than itself. Intuitively, a path with more hops tends to decrease path resilience as the chance of attacker compromising at least one hop is increased. However, in our schemes, the path resilience improvement via choosing highly resilient links overwhelms the negative effect of a little longer paths of a small percentage of nodes. Overall, the path resilience will be improved.
In this paper, we have focused on flat topologies. In some situations nodes could be deployed in hierarchies. The end to end routing here occurs in more than one plane, i.e., sensor to cluster head via multiple sensors, and cluster head to sink via multiple cluster heads. Our methodology and protocols are applicable in hierarchical networks. Cluster heads are chosen as class 1 nodes (provisioned with more keys), while other sensors are chosen as class 2 nodes, class 3 nodes and so on depending on number of hierarchy levels.
Recently, public key cryptography has been receiving attention in WSNs [53] [54] [55] [56] , which can be used to establish pairwise keys between neighboring sensor nodes. However, public key cryptography based scheme involves high energy consumption due to its complicated computation, which may not be preferable for energy constrained sensor nodes. Based on experiments in [54] , [55] and [56] , energy consumption in public key cryptography based pairwise key establishment is about two to three orders of magnitude more than that in the symmetric key cryptography based scheme. In [53] , special hardware is used to reduce energy consumption of public key based operation, which incurs extra cost. Considering that public key cryptography based pairwise key establishment is still energy consuming for energy constrained sensors, random key pre-distribution based pairwise key establishment is still highly relevant and practical for large scale deployment of secure wireless sensor networks. Furthermore, some researchers in the sensor networks area are building their own customized sensor-mote prototypes [57], with lower memory, processing power, and battery life than commercial platforms. For such prototypes also, symmetric key cryptography techniques will have practical relevance.
E. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present performance evaluation based on both analysis and simulation. The analysis is based on our discussions in Section IV-C. We first describe our simulation setup, and then report performance data and our observations. 1) Simulation Setup: We conduct our simulation using a self-made simulator in . The network is circular with radius 500
, where 1000 nodes are uniformly deployed at random. The sink is at the center of the network. Unless otherwise specified, the default parameters are: = 2, 1 = 200, 2 = 800, 1 = 80, 2 = 30, = 40, = 10000, = 100 , = 1 and = 50 (for notation, please refer to Table 2 in Section IV). The default values of 1 , 2 and are chosen such that 1 1 /( 1 + 2 )+ 2 2 /( 1 + 2 ) = , which means the average number of keys disclosed to the attacker is the same in our differentiated key pre-distribution and the original scheme for the same number of captured nodes. Our communication model is one where sensors periodically transmit data to the sink. In the legend in all figures, our GPSR and our minhop refer to our protocols extending GPSR [45] and minimum hop [50] routing presented in Section IV-B respectively. The legends GPSR and minhop refer to the traditional GPSR and minimum hop routing protocols following the uniform key pre-distribution respectively. Each point in the simulation data is the average of 100 runs based on independent random seeds.
2) Sensitivity of
2 to Attack Intensity: In Fig. 2 , we first compare our differentiated key pre-distribution with the traditional uniform key pre-distribution (for both GPSR and minimum hop routing protocols) under different number of captured nodes . We find that while the performance of all schemes degrades with increasing , our schemes are consistently better than those of traditional schemes. We also find that the improvement increases with larger values of . This is because when the attacker captures more nodes, the resilience of highly resilient links in our schemes degrades at a much slower pace than those of the less resilient links in traditional schemes. Besides, we can also observe that the end to end security under minimum hop based protocols is better than their GPSR counterparts. This is because minimum hop based protocols always choose the path with minimum hops, while the GPSR based protocols may choose longer paths, which compromises end to end resilience. The cost though is the increased initial energy consumption in query flooding.
3) Sensitivity of 2 to Network Density: In Fig. 3 , we compare our schemes and traditional schemes under different communication range , which in turn corresponds to different network density (i.e., number of neighbors per node). When is small, 2 is low due to both low connectivity (many nodes cannot find secure neighbors) and low resilience (fewer proxies resulting in fewer key paths for each link). When increases, 2 increases correspondingly. For all values of , our schemes performs consistently better.
4) Sensitivity of network lifetime to parameter :
Recall from Section IV-B that is the knob that trades-off security with lifetime. In Fig. 4 , we compare our schemes and traditional schemes for varying . We define network lifetime as the time until when the first node has used up its energy. Since traditional schemes do not have weight assignment, they are insensitive to . The lifetime in our schemes decreases with larger values of . This is because a larger value of means more priority is given to links with high resilience, thereby draining the corresponding neighbors more rapidly.
We also observe that the extended GPSR has higher lifetime compared with extended minimum hop for smaller values of , and the difference diminishes as increases. This is because for smaller values of , lifetime is mainly decided by total number of candidate forwarders of each node. In extended GPSR, each node usually can find more forwarders (secure neighbors closer to sink) than it can find in extended minimum hop protocol (secure neighbors on minimum hop secure path). When increases, lifetime is mainly decided by the number of most secure neighbors of each node. This number is similar for both protocols, and hence they have similar lifetimes when increases. We also observe that lifetime of traditional GPSR scheme is lower than that of traditional minimum hop scheme. This is because in traditional GPSR scheme, some nodes are so positioned that most of their nearby nodes will choose them as forwarders, which results in their energy being drained quickly. While in traditional minimum hop scheme, nodes are less likely to be the only one on the minimum hop path of most of their neighbors, and thus traffic is more balanced. 2 and network lifetime to number of class 1 nodes: In Figs. 5 and 6 , we compare the traditional schemes, our schemes with default parameters, and our schemes with optimal parameters. The optimal parameters are obtained via our analysis in Section IV-C. The average number of keys pre-distributed per node is the same across all schemes for fairness of comparison. In Fig. 5 , we find that traditional schemes are insensitive to 1 since all nodes are given same number of keys. Our schemes achieve much better performance under intermediate values of 1 , while the performance of our schemes is close to that of traditional schemes for very small and very large values of 1 . This is because when 1 approaches 0 or 1000, all nodes will be given same number of keys, and thus our schemes degrade to traditional schemes. In Fig. 6 , we also observe that lifetime of the traditional schemes is insensitive to 1 due to the same reason as above. The lifetime of our schemes increases with the value of 1 . The case when 1 = 0 can be treated as the same as 1 = 1000. This is because for small values of 1 , the class 1 nodes are given many keys initially, and so they tend to be used as forwarders much more frequently and the lifetime tends to be small. When 1 increases, the number of keys given to class 1 nodes decreases, thus helping to distribute the load more evenly and improve network lifetime. Finally, in both figures, we observe that the optimal parameters derived by our analysis give better performance than the default parameters, which confirms the correctness of our analysis.
5) Sensitivity of
V. BIASED NODE CAPTURING ATTACK AND ITS COUNTERMEASURES
Recall that in traditional attack model discussed in Section II-A, the attacker captures a certain percent of the nodes in the network. Such an attack is an unbiased one since the captured nodes are chosen at random. In this section, we will study a type of advanced attack model, denoted as biased node capturing attack, in which the attacker has bias in choosing nodes to capture, aiming to achieve higher attack impact.
A. Biased Node Capturing Attack
Simply put, biased node capturing attack is one in which the attacker attempts to capture some special nodes in the network. Typically, the capture of those nodes results in higher attack impact, and they are chosen with bias instead of randomly. The existence of such special nodes comes from the fact that the roles (or importance) of sensor nodes in the network are inherently different. In a multi-hop sensor network, the nodes near the sink are such special nodes, whose capture results in more secret information disclosed to the attacker. This is because a node near the sink generally forwards more traffic, and its capture results in more data being disclosed. Thus, the attacker can take advantage of the heterogeneity in topology to capture those important nodes near the sink.
In our differentiated key management, we also introduce a type of heterogeneity among the nodes in that different nodes have different number of pre-distributed keys. The capture of nodes with more pre-distributed keys tends to have higher attack impact due to the fact that more pre-distributed keys are disclosed. Thus, the attacker could also take advantage of the heterogeneity in the number of pre-distributed keys to achieve higher attack impact. Such an attack can be easily accomplished via identifying more resilient links (and hence nodes) via simple traffic analysis of monitored communication.
In Fig. 7 , we show the impacts of three types of biased attacks and the unbiased one. The first biased attack is one that chooses to capture nodes closest to the sink, denoted as topology in Fig. 7 . The second is one that chooses to capture nodes with the largest number of pre-distributed keys, denoted as key in Fig. 7 . The third combines both strategies, in which the attacker first chooses nodes closest to the sink. When multiple nodes are at the same distance to the sink, tie is broken based on the number of keys pre-distributed. Such a combined attack is denoted as topology+key in Fig. 7 .
In Fig. 7 , we find that the biased attacks result in higher attack impact than unbiased one. However, the attack impact caused by biased attack based on topology alone is much more severe than that caused by biased attack based on key alone. Besides, the impact of the combined attack is close to that caused by the biased attack based on topology alone. This is because the nodes close to the sink are generally those forwarding more traffic. The capture of a few such nodes results in a significant portion of the data being disclosed. On the other side, when nodes with more pre-distributed keys are captured, the overall number of pre-distributed keys disclosed is still a small portion of the key pool size. The above observations show that the attack impact caused by topology heterogeneity dominates that caused by key heterogeneity. Combining key heterogeneity with topology heterogeneity does not further degrade security much. Therefore, our differentiated key management technique does not introduce a lot Fig. 6 . Sensitivity of lifetime to number of class 1 nodes 1 . Fig. 7 . Sensitivity of 2 to the strategy of biased attack. Fig. 8 . Sensitivity of 2 to disclosure probability .
of additional negative impacts when the biased attack based on network topology is already in place.
B. Countermeasures
In the following, we will discuss the countermeasures to the biased attacks discussed above.
Note that the biased attack based on topology naturally exists in multi-hop sensor networks, and thus is not introduced by our differentiated key management. Here we discuss its countermeasures briefly. One potential countermeasure is letting the nodes near the sink just forward the encrypted data without needing to decrypt it for aggregation. In this way, the capture of such nodes does not disclose the data forwarded. To do so, nodes with a certain number of hops away from the sink need to be pre-distributed with a unique pairwise key with the sink before node deployment. Such approach comes at the cost that no data aggregation is conducted near the sink. An alternative countermeasure is letting the sink node move around the network so the amount of forwarded traffic is balanced among the nodes in the network. Thus, the impact of such biased attack is alleviated.
As shown in Fig. 7 above, the biased attack based on number of pre-distributed keys causes higher attack impact although such impact is far less than that of biased attack based on topology. One countermeasure is to use tamper resistant hardware for nodes pre-distributed with more keys. Therefore, such nodes become more robust to attack in that the attacker may not be able to obtain secret information in the captured node. Such idea is inspired by the work in [9] where some special nodes are assumed never to disclose their secret information after capture. Here, we relax such assumption and allow a certain probability of secret information in such nodes being disclosed. Such probability is denoted as .
In Fig. 8 , we show sensitivity of 2 to , the probability that nodes with tamper resistant hardware having their secret information disclosed after being captured. All three curves in Fig. 8 are based on GPSR routing. Similar observations are made in minimum hop routing as well. We find that, when tamper resistant hardware can achieve a disclosure probability less than 0.5, the security performance of our differentiated key management under biased attack based on number of pre-distributed keys is better than that under unbiased attack. When is between 0.5 and 0.8, the performance under biased attack falls below that under unbiased attack since more pre-distributed keys are disclosed. However, it is still better than that in traditional uniform key management. Only when becomes larger than 0.8 (ineffective tamper resistant hardware), the performance of differentiated key management under biased attack is worse than that in traditional uniform key management. In summary, with reasonably effective tamper resistant hardware ( < 0.5), the performance of our differentiated key management will not degrade under biased attack. Such improvement comes at the cost of tamper resistant hardware. However, we only need to provide tamper resistant hardware for a small portion of the nodes, which is worthwhile considering the security performance improvement.
An alternative countermeasure to the biased attack based on the number of pre-distributed keys is one where camouflaging techniques are applied. Such camouflaging techniques aim to hide those nodes with more pre-distributed keys. During pairwise key establishment, each node sends 1 key IDs to its neighbors. Recall 1 is maximum among all ′ . If the number of keys distributed in node is smaller than 1 , node will append random dummy key IDs to ensure a homogeneous key ID list size. During the routing path selection and later communications, important nodes are more likely to receive/send more packets due to the high resilience of its links. Our alternative path routing can help alleviate this problem when traffic forwarding is shared by multiple neighbors. Besides, we can let nodes with low traffic burden send dummy traffic to maintain a homogeneous communication burden among all nodes. Based on the above camouflaging techniques, all nodes in our protocol tend to behave homogeneously. Therefore, the attacker cannot distinguish nodes with more keys from others. This approach costs extra communication overhead.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the issue of providing end to end secure communications in randomly deployed wireless sensor networks, via differentiated key pre-distribution, where the idea is to distribute different number of keys to different sensors to enhance the resilience of certain links in the network. This feature is leveraged during routing, where nodes route through links with higher resilience. We present our end to end secure communication protocol based on the above methodology by extending well known location centric (GPSR) and data centric (minimum hop) routing protocols. Detailed theoretical analysis and performance evaluations demonstrate the strengths of our techniques.
